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Abstract
We assess risk factors affecting the severity and dynamics of civil wars, departing
from analyses focused primarily on static models of the effect of income on the extensive
margin of conflict. Civil conflicts are shown to be persistent, but rarely do they become
more severe in response to past fighting. Substantial heterogeneity in the speed of mean
reversion is documented: severe fighting lasts longest in poor countries and ethnically
fractionalized countries.
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1 Introduction
Civil conflicts vary greatly in their intensity. Over the last half-century, the number of combat
deaths during a year of civil conflict has ranged from less than 100 to over 100,000. This
variation is present both across countries and within conflict spells. Deaths from combat are
the most direct consequence of these conflicts, making the tremendous amount of variation
in conflict intensity inherently important.
This paper makes two contributions. First, we conduct the most extensive analysis to date
of the relationship between per-capita income and the intensity of civil conflict. Using cross-
national data on the number of battle deaths resulting from combat between governments
and rebel groups from 1960 to 2008, the effect of income on the battle deaths in conflict is
both statistically and economically meaningful. The best estimate from a Blundell and Bond
(1998) model of the effect of income on battle deaths is that a unit change in log-income
leads to a reduction of 321 battle deaths in the current year and 720 deaths overall after
accounting for the impulse response of a perturbation.1
The second and most important set of results provides estimates of dynamics. Analyzing
the severity of civil conflicts allows us to estimate rich models of how conflicts evolve and
persist over time. We initially describe the overall level of persistence of conflict intensity
and then assess heterogeneity in persistence. Several results related to the dynamics of
conflict are of interest:
1) Conflict intensity is mean-reverting but persistent, with an average AR(1) coeffi-
cient between 0.55 and 0.78. Restricting analysis to conflict-spells in adjacent years, data
visualization suggests that an AR(1) model fits the time series of conflicts well.
2) Past fighting does not cause escalation of conflict except in rare cases. While the
average behavior of the conflict time series makes clear that conflicts mean revert, is it
possible that some conflicts escalate in response to past fighting? In its most crude form,
the inference that escalation is uncommon comes from comparing estimates of the persistence
of conflict intensity with estimates of the persistence of conflict on the extensive margin. The
estimated AR(1) coefficient governing the extensive margin of civil conflict is much larger
1When using the extensive margin of civil war as the dependent variable, a one unit increase in log-income
reduces the probability of civil conflict by 1.2 percentage points in the current period. Since the average
year of civil conflict has 2, 809 deaths, the average effect of a one unit change in log-income on battle deaths
is about 34 deaths in the current year and 330 total deaths after accounting for the impulse response of a
current period perturbation.
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than the estimated AR(1) coefficient governing the intensity of conflict, suggesting that
conflicts smolder, with low levels of fighting, but conflicts, in expectation, do not erupt in
response to past fighting.
In richer models that allow the persistence of conflict to differ based on a country’s income,
conflicts do not escalate in response to past fighting except for the poorest countries in the
sample. Conflicts are, however, more persistent in poorer countries, and for extraordinarily
poor countries it is not possible to reject that the conflict process is explosive. That is, for
1-2 percent of the conflict-years in our sample, when heterogeneity in the autocorrelation-
coefficient governing battle deaths is permitted, the AR (1) coefficient implied by the data
is greater than 1.
3) A related interpretation is that the rate of mean reversion, and thus the half-life of
the battle deaths time series, varies substantially with income. For observed conflicts, in
country-years in the top 5 percent of the income distribution, it takes less than 1 year for
the deaths from a conflict shock to decline to half the level of the shock. In stark contrst,
for country-years in the bottom 5 percent of the income distribution, it takes over 9 years
for the deaths from a conflict shock to decline to half the level of the shock.
4) Among four other factors identified in the prior literature as correlates of civil war, eth-
nic fractionalization is most associated with prolonged conflict persistence.2 Oil producing
countries have conflicts that die out relatively quickly, primarily because these countries tend
to be relatively wealthy. Countries with high religious fractionalization and mountainous
terrain do not differ from other countries in terms of conflict persistence.
Our findings regarding the dynamics of civil conflict have implications for the broader
literature estimating the effect of income and other factors on civil conflict. Existing findings
for the effect of income on civil war are varied. We isolate one potential reason for these
varied results: static models and the IV strategies that they use are biased when the exclusion
restriction is a“conditional restriction”and the underlying process is dynamic. That is, when
the instrument is only valid conditional on a fixed effect, IV estimates from static models
will be biased when the empirical process is state-dependent. We characterize this bias and
suggest that it is likely to be large.
Throughout the analysis, we take seriously the endogeneity of economic performance,
spillovers across countries, and unobserved heterogeneity. To account for endogeneity, the
economic performance of a country’s export partners is used as an instrument for per-capita
income. This identification strategy is similar to Acemoglu et al. (2008) in their study of
2Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005); Fearon and Laitin (2003); Ross (2004).
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the relationship between income and democracy. The approach in this paper modifies the
Acemoglu et al. (2008) instrument; by removing adjacent countries when calculating the
per-capita income of export partners, the potential for geographic spillovers and spatially-
correlated shocks that may violate the exclusion restriction is reduced. The exclusion
restriction is plausible, requiring that economic fluctuations in a country’s distant export
destinations are related to civil conflict only through their effect on income.
One word of caution is necessary about the set of results regarding conflict dynamics. The
empirical work in this area relies on data at the country level which may be measured with
error. A number of steps are taken to assess the sensitivity of the estimates, all of which yield
the conclusion that the dynamics of civil conflict are essential for our understanding of the
conflict process. While measurement error in the conflict intensity data is not a problem for
the dependent variable, serially correlated measurement error may bias estimates when using
dynamic models and panel-style instruments. The results are robust to using instruments
for the dynamic panel model that are more or less prone to serially correlated measurement
error.
Going forward, this research should be augmented with more data at the micro-level
within conflicts. Cross-national analysis of explanations for the onset and occurrence of civil
wars led to a rich body of theoretical and empirical work examining the micro-mechanisms
behind these findings. These initial findings suggest an agenda for new inquiry on the
evolution and dynamics of civil wars.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly surveys existing literature
and motivates the study of conflict severity and dynamics. Section 3 defines measurements of
conflict severity. Section 4 describes the instrument and empirical strategy. Section 5 reports
the baseline results for the effect of income shocks on the intensity of conflict. Section 6
analyzes conflict dynamics in detail. Section 7 discusses the potential bias of static models,
compares our estimates with existing literature and concludes.
2 Background
The extensive margin of civil conflict and the number battle deaths, although correlated with
one another, are distinct phenomena. Figure 1 plots the distribution of the logged number
of battle deaths for country-years with positive battle deaths, showing there is tremendous
variation in the number of deaths in particular country-years. In addition, when battle
deaths are positive, they tend to be bunched together over time. This suggests either that
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whatever factors are responsible for civil conflict are long lived or that conflicts are state
dependent.
[Figure 1 About Here]
The existing literature focuses on risk factors explaining the outbreak of civil conflict,
with the most recent focus on the effect of income on civil conflict.3 The empirical work
linking income shocks with the extensive margin of civil conflict has produced varying results.
Among the most recent papers, Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) find that economic
growth, instrumented by a country’s rainfall, has a negative effect on the probability of civil
war in sub-Saharan Africa from 1979-1999. Bru¨ckner and Ciccone (2010) also find that
shocks to the price of a country’s exports increase the probability of civil war in a similar
sample. Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2010) find no relationship between poverty and the
probability a country is engaged in civil war using a broader sample and different estimators.
Bazzi and Blattman (2011) find weak evidence linking commodity price shocks and civil war
across a broad array of specifications.4
At least two mechanisms motivate the prior studies on the link between income and civil
conflict: opportunity costs and state capacity. In opportunity cost models, income shocks
increase the likelihood of civil conflict by decreasing the relative cost of rebellion. For an
individual choosing between lawful participation in the economy and insurgency, negative
economic shocks may increase the attractiveness of fighting relative to employment (Collier
3For a recent survey of this literature, see Blattman and Miguel (2010).
4To the best of our knowledge, only Lacina (2006), Bazzi and Blattman (2011) and Esteban, Mayoral
and Ray (2012) study the severity of civil conflicts cross-nationally. Lacina (2006) and Bazzi and Blattman
(2011) find limited effects of economic shocks on conflict severity, while Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012)
explain variation in the intensity of civil conflict using several different indices of the distribution of ethnic
types within a country. Both Lacina (2006) and Bazzi and Blattman (2011) select the sample based on
cases where conflict is occurring; their goal is to study whether economic fluctuations matter conditional
on conflict. As will become clear later, we take a different approach because characterizing the dynamics
of conflict requires use of the years without conflict as well. Lacina (2006) regresses the number of battle
deaths in 114 country-year observations between 1946 and 2002, for which there were over 900 battle deaths,
on the log of the country’s GDP, lagged one year, and a set of explanatory variables measuring theoretically
important quantities like the country’s regime type, population, religious and ethnic polarization, etc. She
finds no effect for logged GDP on the number of battle deaths. Bazzi and Blattman (2011) regress battle
deaths from civil conflict on price shocks to a country’s commodity exports, a count of the number of years
of conflict, and an indicator for civil war onset. They find a negative effect for commodity price shocks;
increases in the prices of a country’s commodity exports decrease the number of battle deaths experienced
by a country-year in some of their specifications. In related studies specific to Colombia, Angrist and Kugler
(2008) and Dube and Vargas (Forthcoming) study the effects of commodity price shocks on the intensity of
ongoing civil conflicts in particular regions, which vary in their sensitivity to the particular commodity price
shock.
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and Hoeﬄer, 1998; Besley and Persson, 2011; Dal Bo´ and Dal Bo´, 2011; Dube and Var-
gas, Forthcoming). The second mechanism describes the possibility that negative economic
shocks decrease the state’s ability to buy-off or effectively suppress rebellious groups’ capacity
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003).5
This paper pushes the literature forward by simultaneously analyzing the time-path that
civil wars follow as well as risk factors, like income shocks, that explain the outbreak of civil
war. Both theoretical mechanisms linking economic measures with the extent of civil conflict
suggest that civil conflict should be state-dependent, with past shocks affecting the future
trajectory of conflict. For a combatant who is comparing the costs and benefits of rebellion
versus lawful employment, choosing rebellion entails significant sunk costs. Once associated
with rebellious groups, a combatant cannot always easily return to lawful employment, even
if improving economic conditions make fighting sufficiently unattractive. Choosing to become
a rebel, especially in conflicts where the incumbent government retains power, may entail
the significant risk of being labeled a traitor, resulting in future prosecution or execution.
Similarly, the competence or inadequacy of state capacity is likely to be persistent. The
ability of states to provide adequate public goods and suppress rebellions is slow-moving.
Weak states are likely to stay weak, even when transitory economic improvements make
them stronger temporarily.
Several other factors have been proposed in the literature as correlates of civil war that
could also affect the time-paths of civil conflicts. For example, ethno-linguistic or religious
fractionalization or polarization have been linked to the occurrence of civil conflict (Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol, 2005). They might also make conflicts more persistent, in addition to
making conflict more likely. Once ethnic or religious tensions boil over to violent conflict,
this may make divisions between groups more salient or more precisely defined, making a
negotiated settlement more difficult. The presence of natural resources, such as oil, has also
been linked to the occurrence of civil conflict (Ross, 2004). The theoretical link between
natural resources and conflict dynamics is less clear. The presence of a consistent flow of
5The theoretical mechanisms that motivate empirical analyses of the extensive margin of civil war would
seem to apply equally well to the intensive margin. For opportunity costs mechanisms, income shocks
may make rebellion relatively more attractive for each individual citizen, which increases the number of
combatants at risk of dying in combat. Some micro-level evidence supports this possibility. Using data
on recruitment during the Sierra Leone civil war, Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) find that individual-
level poverty is associated with an increased probability of joining both the rebellion and the government
counter-rebellion. On the other hand, Berman et al. (2011) find that higher unemployment levels were not
associated with higher rates of insurgent attacks against government forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the
Philippines. For state capacity mechanisms, decreased ability to buy-off or suppress rebellion may also
increase the number of individuals fighting and therefore the number at risk of dying.
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rents from natural resources might make conflicts more persistent. On the other hand, one
group capturing a valuable, resource rich area might be able to translate that wealth into
increased military capacity, which they could use to escalate or win (and potentially end) a
particular conflict. Finally, the terrain of a country has also been linked to the occurrence
of conflict, with mountainous terrain favoring insurgency (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). This
theoretical mechanism could also affect conflict persistence. If terrain affords insurgents
the ability to mount persistent guerilla attacks, while limiting the state’s ability to conduct
counter-insurgency operations, then we would expect mountainous terrain to be associated
with persistent, simmering conflicts.
The empirical models that follow shed light on both the static and dynamic relationship
between per-capita income and the costliness of civil conflict. The opportunity cost theory
and the state-capacity theory provide the same qualitative predictions and are tested jointly
against a null hypothesis that there is no relationship between economic measures and civil
conflict. This null hypothesis has gained prominence in the literature and is rejected when
employing data on conflict intensity in the first part of the paper.
The second part of the paper then tracks the evolution of the severity of civil conflict. We
provide overall estimates of the persistence of conflict intensity, and then examine whether
particular country characteristics -fractionalization, oil exports, and mountainous terrain-
are associated with increased persistence of conflict intensity.
3 Data
The dependent variable in subsequent models is BattleDeathsit, which describes the number
of battle deaths resulting from civil conflict in country i during year t. The battle deaths
data are from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and accompanying Battle Deaths
Dataset, which collects data on civil conflicts defined as “internal armed conflict [occurring]
between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s)” (Gleditsch
et al., 2002, p. 9). Battle deaths are“deaths resulting directly from violence inflicted through
the use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict during contested combat” (Lacina and
Gleditsch, 2005, p. 3).6 The battle deaths data cover civil conflicts in 196 countries from
6The Armed Conflict Dataset distinguishes between civil conflicts with and without outside intervention
from a foreign state. We focus on civil conflicts without outside intervention. The definition of battle deaths
excludes deaths not related to combat, e.g. violence solely against civilians or execution of prisoners of war.
We use version 4 of the Armed Conflict Dataset and version 3.0 of the Battle Deaths Dataset- the most
recent version of each. Note that a civil conflict must have at least 25 battle deaths to enter the Armed
Conflict Dataset. The Battle Deaths Dataset records a “low,”“high,” and “best” estimate for the number of
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1960-2008.7
Table 1 provides summary statistics for each measure of civil conflict for different regional
breakdowns: the full sample, a sample restricted to sub-Saharan Africa, the full sample ex-
cluding Western Democracies and Japan, and the full sample excluding sub-Saharan Africa.8
In all breakdowns, conflict intensity varies greatly. Standard deviations of battle deaths are
approximately 6-8 times the means, emphasizing the variation in conflict intensity, as dis-
played in Figure 1.
[Table 1 About Here]
Before proceeding, it is well known that battle deaths data are difficult to collect and are
susceptible to measurement error. There are at least two reasons why their use is preferable
to a coarse function of the underlying data.
First, measurement error in the dependent variable is irrelevant for the consistency of
the parameter estimates. As discussed later, both finite sample concerns and measurement
error that is correlated with income are unlikely to affect inference. One concern, however,
is that the lagged dependent variable in the dynamic model may enter with measurement
error. We use a number of approaches, including the use of instrumental variables that are
more or less susceptible to serially correlated measurement error, to assess the sensitivity of
results.9
Second, analyzing the intensity of civil conflict avoids another well-known measurement
battle deaths. We use the “best” estimate.
7For those interested with comparisons to the existing literature, two binary measures of the extensive
margin of civil wars are used to estimate models for comparison purposes. The first is a binary indicator
based on a 25 death country-year threshold: the variable warit equals one if country i experienced at least
25 battle deaths in year t. The second is an indicator of civil war based on spells of conflict, warFLit, which
uses the Fearon and Laitin measurement of the occurrence of civil war. The Fearon and Laitin dataset covers
156 countries from 1960-1999, and codes the beginning and end of conflict spells that accrued at least 1,000
cumulative battle deaths.
8Region codings are from Fearon and Laitin (2003). The larger sample sizes for the Uppsala PRIO-based
measurements are because of their greater temporal coverage than the Fearon and Laitin dataset. The means
for Fearon and Laitin’s binary indicator are higher than the binary indicator based on the battle deaths data
because Fearon and Laitin code some country years as civil war even if there is a year-long lull in an ongoing
war.
9Results are similar if the data are winsorized, suggesting that outliers due to erroneous data are not
driving the estimates. When alternative values of the series employing the lowest estimated battle deaths
total are used, the estimates of persistence are larger while the effect of income on deaths is smaller. The
latter finding is consistent with the fact that the mean number of battle deaths in the low series is less
than half the mean of the ”best” series. Results also do not depend on whether interpolation is used to
replace missing values. The compined results suggest that the estimates are not sensitive to outliers, severely
mis-measured dependent variables, or serially correlated measurement error on the right hand side.
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issue in the study of civil wars: defining what constitutes a civil war. In the vast majority of
cross-national studies of civil war, the dependent variable is binary, taking on a value of one
if a particular country-year observation is associated with the onset or occurrence of a civil
war. What constitutes civil war depends on a variety of definitional criteria. Most datasets
choose one of two approaches. The first approach is to pick a particular threshold for the
number of battle deaths that must occur in a particular country-year observation for that
observation to be considered a civil war. A related approach treats civil wars as spells of
tension with a beginning and end, and in which there may be intermittent years without
any battle deaths. Codings of the second type generally choose a total number of battle
deaths or a yearly-average number of battle deaths (often 1,000 total deaths or an average
of 1,000 yearly deaths) that a conflict spell must exceed in order to be considered a civil
war as opposed to lower level civil unrest. Datasets vary in the thresholds chosen and in
defining the beginning or end of particular conflict spells. The existing literature does not
have a consensus on what constitutes a civil war and uses (at least) 11 different datasets.
According to Sambanis (2004), the correlation between pairs of datasets concerning civil war
onset is often low, sometimes even as low as 0.42, and the average correlation is only 0.68.
In some instances, the choice of threshold for civil war classification can double the number
of country-years considered to be at war.10
10These definitional discrepancies are non-trivial. Classification error with a binary dependent variable
results in inconsistent parameter estimates. In finite samples, the biases that emerge from misclassification
can be severe. In a series of Monte Carlo simulations, Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) show
that even classification error of 2 percent yields parameter estimates that are biased by 15 to 25 percent
of the true value. Sambanis (2004) and Hegre and Sambanis (2006) demonstrate that choices regarding
the definition of civil wars can indeed change empirical conclusions. They estimate the effect of economic
growth on the onset and occurrence of civil war using a set of commonly used datasets and find that the sign
of economic growth is positive in approximately half the regressions and negative in the other half. Bazzi
and Blattman (2011) find similar inconsistencies in their analysis of the effects of commodity price shocks.
In fact, Sambanis (2004) speculates that “one way around these problems is to stop trying to ... analyze
civil wars as a distinct phenomenon and, instead, to code levels of violence along a continuum” (p. 819).
Analyzing the intensity of civil conflict does exactly this, avoiding definitional problems by focusing on the
level of violence in a particular country-year rather than focusing on whether or not to call that country-year
a civil war. Our point is not that battle deaths data are a panacea for this problems. Rather, it is important
to recognize that there are strengths and weaknesses to the binary and continuous approaches.
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4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Excluded Instruments
Because civil wars and more intense civil conflicts are likely to be associated with decreased
income, we use an instrumental variables approach to identify the effect of per-capita in-
come.11 The instrument is similar to that described in (Acemoglu et al., 2008) of income
and democratization. The instrument measures export-weighted shocks to the GDP of a
country’s trading partners, and is designed to capture “the transmission of business cycles
from one country to another through trade” (Acemoglu et al., 2008, p. 824).
The first step is to construct a set of time-invariant weights, wij, that measure the de-
gree of connectivity between country i and country j through exports from i to j, as a
percentage of country i’s GDP. Because it is possible that civil conflict has a direct effect on
geographically proximate trade partners’ GDP, the instrument construction sets geographi-
cally connected countries’ weights to 0. That is, to help alleviate spatial spillovers that may
violate the exlusion restriction, when constructing the weights for country i, all countries
that are contiguous with i are excluded.12 Also, the (Acemoglu et al., 2008) instrument
uses total trade -imports and exports- to construct their weights. Here, the weights are
distinctly based only on exports. This change is made because the effect of an income shock
to an import partner is likely to have a different effect on income than a shock to an export
partner.13
The weight for dyad ij, wij, is constructed by:
wij =
I (Non− Contiguousij)
Υij
1989∑
s=1980
Xijs
GDPis
(1)
where Υij is the number of years for which bilateral trade data are available for dyad i, j
between 1980 and 1989.14 Xijs is the value of exports from country i to country j in year s
11Other papers use a variety of instruments for income. Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) use
a function of rainfall and Bru¨ckner and Ciccone (2010) use export weighted commodity prices. Hidalgo
et al. (2010) also employ rainfall as an instrument for income in their study of Brazilian land invasions and
occupations. Bazzi and Blattman (2011) use commodity price shocks.
12Contiguity is defined by the Correlates of War project. Contiguous countries are those that share a land
or river border or are separated by less than 400 miles of water.
13Results using weights constructed with total trade are similar, but the instrument is not as strong.
14Trade data are from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). We used
the years 1980-1989 to maximize coverage, but for countries without trade data for the 1980s we constructed
weights using trade data from the 1970s, and 1990s when data for the 1970s and 1980s were unavailable.
Xiis = 0 by construction.
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in 1967 U.S. dollars.15 GDPis measures the total GDP of country i in year s in 1967 U.S.
dollars.16
The instrument, Zit, is constructed by:
Zit =
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
wijIjtlog(GDPjt)

N∑
j=1,j 6=i
wij
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Ijtwij
 (2)
where Ijt is an indicator for whether data for log(GDPjt) are available. The final term,
in parentheses, corrects for the unbalanced nature of the panel by adjusting the weights to
ensure that the sum of the weights is the same for country i across time. In a balanced
panel, this term equals one. The total GDP of country j in year t is measured the same as
in equation 1.
The main explanatory variable of interest outside of the battle deaths time series is logged
per capita GDP of country i in year t in 1967 U.S. dollars.17 Because panel GMM estimators
are used later, the relevant first stage regression to assess instrument strength is:
∆ log (GDPit/Populationit) = β∆Zit + δt + uit (3)
where δt is a year fixed effect. Some specifications are estimated with country-specific time
trends, making the model ∆ log (GDPit/Populationit) = β∆Zit + δt + αi + uit where αi is a
country fixed effect.
Table 2 shows results from the first stage. The model is estimated on four samples: all
countries with available data, sub-Saharan African countries, all countries except western
democracies, and all countries except sub-Saharan Africa. Each specification in Panel A
corresponds to parameter estimates from Equation 3. In each sub-sample, the relation-
ship between the instrument and logged per capita GDP is positive and significant. The
instrument is comparably strong in this sample as in the sample used by Acemoglu et al.
(2008).18 In addition, the F-statistic is larger than 10 in each of these four samples, the rule-
of-thumb for instrument strength. Panel B of Table 2 adds country fixed effects to 3, which
15Nominal data are deflated to U.S. 1967 dollars using the IMF’s World Development Indicators (WDI)
inflation data.
16GDP data are constructed using the IMF’s WDI data and data from Goldstein, Rivers and Tomz (2007).
17Data for Populationit, the population of country i in year t are from the Penn World Tables.
18Acemoglu et al. (2008) estimate a coefficient ranging from 0.402 to 0.529, using a lagged instrument,
five-year observations in the panel, and some additional covariates.
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corresponds to country-specific time trends in levels. The instrument retains its strength,
although the F-statistic falls slightly below 10 in the some of the regional sub-samples.
[Table 2 About Here]
4.2 Empirical Model I: Restricted Model
We first discuss a baseline model that recovers the average effect of economic shocks on
the intensity of civil conflict and the average AR (1) parameter governing the persistence
of conflicts. The model is based on the dynamic panel data model proposed in Blundell
and Bond (1998). The Blundell-Bond estimator can accommodate unobserved heterogeneity
in a country’s intensity of civil conflict, serial correlation in the civil conflict process, and
endogenous realizations of the economic shock. The model in levels is
yit = αi + γyi,t−1 + β log (Incomeit/Populationit) + δt + εit (4)
where yit is the dependent variable of interest, γ measures the persistence of the process, β is
the effect of a unit change in log per-capita income on yit, αi is a country fixed effect, and δt
is a year fixed effect. We call this the restricted model because the autoregressive coefficient
is constrained to be common across all countries.
The Blundell-Bond estimator allows for instruments outside of the system, and the
export-weighted income measure is employed as an instrument for log (GDPit/Populationit) .
The estimator used is a “system” GMM estimator as opposed to a “difference” GMM esti-
mator. We use the system estimator because of the poor performance of the difference
estimator when elements of the history of the process in levels yi,t−2, ..., yi,1 are weak instru-
ments for lagged differences (yi,t−1 − yi,t−2). This insight about the weakness of instruments
was originally developed by Blundell and Bond in part to accommodate the case where the
process {yit} is close to a unit root; in such settings lagged levels of the process will have
little predictive power for future differences. In this setting, because many adjacent years
of the process have zero battle deaths, levels are poor instruments for future differences for
the same reason.19
19The level panel instrument fails weak instrument tests in the difference gmm equation. Adding the
system component helps to alleviate concern about the strength of the panel instruments. Adding the levels
equation, of course, relies on additional assumptions about growth rates of the process being stationary. Year
fixed effects remove any aggregate failures of the stationarity assumption. Models are additionally estimated
with country-specific time trends to remove differential growth rates across countries.
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In the difference equation, the instruments for (yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) are adjusted based on
the results of autocorrelation tests. We dynamically adjust the instrument matrix; if
s is the order of autocorrelation detected at the 10 percent level, then the instruments
for (yi,t−1 − yi,t−2) will consist of yi,t−s−2, yi,t−s−3, and yi,t−s−4 (assuming data availability;
otherwise, suitable lags will be used subject to the serial correlation tests). The instru-
ments for yi,t−1 in the level equation are the corresponding instruments in lagged differences.
The instrument for log (Incomeit/Populationit) is only the contemporaneous trade-weighted
measure. The forward orthogonal deviations transformation is used to preserve available
observations (Arellano and Bover, 1995) and statistical inference is based on panel robust
standard errors.
Before continuing, it is worth addressing the implications of measurement error. In the
classical errors in variables problem, if the right hand side x variable is measured with error,
it is possible to use an instrumental variables regression using, z, an instrument that also
contains measurement error, to consistently estimate the parameter of interest so long as the
measurement error in x and z is independent. Panel instruments based on lags of the data
may not solve the consistency problem because the measurement error may be autocorrelated.
For example, if data are interpolated, the interpolation procedure will introduce correlated
measurement error.
To overcome this difficulty, it is possible to use relatively coarse functions of the lagged
data as instruments for the lagged dependent variable. These coarse functions do not capture
as much information as the original lagged dependent variable, but they are less likely to be
measured with error that is correlated with the measurement error in the lagged dependent
variable. While the intensity of fighting in any given year may be measured wtih error, the
start dates and end dates of conflict are subject to less measurement error than data on the
timing of battle deaths. Because of this, an alternative instrument defined as lags of a con-
flict indicator times conflict duration, I (BattleDeathsit ≥ 25) × (t− lastY earOfPeaceit) ,
is constructed. Measurement error in this measure, if there is any, is likely to have very
little correlation with measurement error in yi,t−1.
4.3 Empirical Model II: Unrestricted Model
We also use the estimator to study how conflict evolves over time while allowing the persis-
tence of conflict to vary with a country’s income level.20 The following model is estimated
20An alternative interpretation is that this more flexible model captures the intensive margin of income
on civil conflict by conditioning the effect of income on lagged battle deaths.
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to allow potential heterogeneity in conflict dynamics based on income:
yit = αi + γ1yi,t−1 + γ2yi,t−1 × log (Incomei,t−1/Populationi,t−1) + (5)
β log (Incomeit−1/Populationit−1) + δt + εit.
We call this the unrestricted model because the autoregressive coefficient is allowed to
vary according to income. In estimating the unrestricted model, the coarsened instrument in-
teracted with the income-instrument, Zit×I (BattleDeathsit ≥ 25)×(t− lastY earOfPeaceit) ,
is included. The model uses lagged income rather than concurrent income to ease interpre-
tation of the interaction of lagged income and lagged battle deaths.
4.4 Parameter Interpretation
Some discussion of the interpretation of parameters is necessary before proceeding to results.
The parameters of interest are γ1, γ2, and β, but it is difficult to interpret γ2 and γ1 in the
unrestricted model. It is instead easiest to interpret the rate of intertemporal spillover in
fighting for each conflict-year, defined as
γ˜i,t−1 =
γˆ1yi,t−1 + γˆ2yi,t−1 × log (Incomei,t−1/Populationi,t−1)
yi,t−1
. (6)
A second summary measure that is useful is the half-life of the battle deaths process, cal-
culated as log (0.5) / log (γ˜i,t−1) in the unrestricted model, Equation 5, and log (0.5) / log (γ)
in the restricted model (4).
The parameter β in the restricted model, Equation 4, is the combined intensive and
extensive marginal effect of log income changes on battle deaths. To understand what this
means, some background on the traditional tobit model may help with intuition. In OLS, the
slope parameter (in this case β) is biased toward zero because of the mass of data censored at
the origin. If there is a corner solution–that is, zero is the actual choice agents make rather
than the result of censoring–then the slope parameter from OLS captures the marginal effect
from crossing into the uncensored portion of the data and the slope once moving into the
uncensored portion. This is the combined (overall) empirical marginal effect. If, on the
other hand, the mass is due to censoring, the OLS parameter estimate does not have this
interpretation–and the parameter β is neither the extensive, intensive, or overall marginal
effect.
While there is a point-mass of battle deaths at 0, we do not correct for this in the sense
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of a tobit model, as 0 is the theoretical minimum number of possible battle deaths in a year.
Therefore, the marginal effects recovered are the combined marginal effects on the intensive
and extensive margin. The marginal effect on the extensive margin can be recovered easily
using the extensive margin indicator as the dependent variable. However, the marginal
effect on the intensive margin is much more difficult to recover because it requires an explicit
hurdle crossing model (like tobit).21
5 Results for Restricted Model
Having described the empirical strategy, we now turn to the presentation of the results on
the relationship between civil conflict severity and per-capita income. Panel A of Table
3 shows parameter estimates of Equation 4 using the number of battle deaths from civil
conflict as the dependent variable and suitable lags of battle deaths as instruments for battle
deathsi,t−1. Column 1 contains estimates of the parameters for all countries in the sample.
The estimated marginal effect of a unit increase in the logarithm of per-capita income is
−321 battle deaths per year. In addition to this contemporaneous effect of income on the
intensity of civil war, the results strongly show that these battle deaths will propagate into
additional deaths in the future. The coefficient on BattleDeathsi,t−1, γˆ, is 0.55. Using the
coefficient on income and lagged battle deaths, the total decrease in expected number of
deaths from a one-unit increase in log-income is approximately βˆ
1−γˆ =
−321
1−0.55 ≈ −720.22
The next specifications in Panel A provide results for the regional sub-samples. In
all specifications, log-income is negatively and significantly associated with battle deaths.
The lagged battle deaths variable is also positive and statistically significant across the
specifications. The degree of persistence exhibits some heterogeneity across the specifications,
ranging from 0.71 in the sub-Saharan Africa sample to 0.42 in the sample that excludes sub-
Saharan Africa. The point estimates for the reduction in the expected number of long-run
battle deaths range from 676 to 998 across the samples.23 The specification also allows us
to estimate the expected half-life of conflict deaths. The expected half-life of battle deaths
21We experimented with using a semi-parametric version of the panel data tobit model to accomplish this
goal (the traditional tobit model is inconsistent with fixed effects), but the estimator requires substantially
more uncensored data than were present. Therefore, the best that we can do is recover combined marginal
effects and elasticities.
22In terms of elasticities, the most intuitive measure is the short-run version elasticity: βˆ/deaths ≈
−321/335 = −0.96.
23These results do not appear to be driven by outliers – estimates are very similar when we limit the
sample to conflict year pairs (current and lagged conflict years) with fewer than 50,000 battle deaths or when
we winsorize the conflict data.
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is 1.2 years for the entire sample and is largest, 2 years, when we restrict the analyses to
sub-Saharan nations.
[Table 3 About Here]
Panel B of Table 3 repeats the analysis in Panel A with the alternative instruments
for lagged battle deaths, I (warit) × (t− lastY earOfPeaceit). The possibility of correlated
measurement error in battle deaths (one potential ramification of interpolation in the battle
deaths data) motivates the need to check the sensitivity to alternative instruments for lagged
battle deaths.24 The use of the interaction of lagged binary war indicators and conflict
duration as instruments instead of lagged battle deaths in Panel B alleviates some potential
concern. As in Panel A, the shock to trading partners’ GDP is also included as an instrument.
The results with these alternative instruments largely corroborate the findings in Panel A. In
all samples, the coefficient estimate on log per capita GDP is statistically significant, ranging
from -225.7 to -127.6. The magnitude of the autoregressive parameter is even greater than
in Panel A. The estimates of the long-run decrease in expected number of battle deaths from
a one unit increase in log per capita GDP range from -538 to -1062. The estimated half-life
of battle deaths are slightly higher in these specifications than in the results in Panel A. The
estimated half-life for the entire sample of nations is 2.5 years and once again the largest
estimate is found in the sub-Saharan African sample.
The specifications reported in Panels A and B include year fixed effects. Panels C and D
add country-specific time trends to allow the conflict process to evolve idiosyncratically across
countries. Again, battle deaths are estimated to decrease in response to increases in log per
capita GDP across all specifications. These results are statistically significant in all samples
with the exception of the sample that excludes western democracies. The magnitude of the
long-run decrease in battle deaths from a unit increase in log per capita GDP is -1640 in the
specification with lagged battle deaths as instruments and -1359 in the specification with the
lagged interaction of the binary war indicator and conflict duration. These magnitudes are
even larger than the results in Panels A and B. Unlike in Panels A and B, where we fail to
reject the validity of the instruments in all specifications, overidentification test rejects the
24Another possibility is to exclude observations with interpolated values of the dependent variable from
the sample. This analysis is in the appendix and the results are qualitatively similar. This approach is not
preferred, however, because the data show that missing year-to-year coverage of conflict intensity is associated
with much more severe conflicts. Difficulty in measurement is likely increasing with conflict severity, and
discarding observations for which interpolation is necessary potentially biases downward estimates of civil
conflict severity.
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lags of battle deaths used as instruments in some of the specifications employed in Panel C.
None of the models using the interaction of lagged war indicators and duration as instruments
(Panel D) are rejected. The estimated half-lives are generally similar to the results in Panels
A and B. The estimates range across sample regions from 0.7 to 1.5 years in the Panel C
specifications and 1.2 to 7 years in the Panel D specifications. Again, the sub-Saharan Africa
sample has the highest estimated half-life.
The qualitative consistency of results across specifications and across sub-samples sug-
gests a negative relationship between civil conflict severity and income per-capita. This
is consistent with existing theories of civil conflicts. The differing estimates of γˆ across
specifications suggests that the choice of instruments matter. It is not surprising that γˆ is
largest using the set of instruments least prone to serially correlated measurement error.
6 Results for Unrestricted Model: Dynamics and the
Evolution of Conflicts
Given the importance of dynamics for the parameter estimates, a natural question is: what
can be learned from the estimates regarding the evolution of civil conflicts? This section
addresses that question using the unrestricted model described above. Several novel results
are of interest. First, the evolution of conflict does not appear, in itself, to vary with the
past level of fighting. That is, an AR(1) model appears to fit the data well overall.
Second, it appears that conflicts are most persistent in poor countries. When allowing for
heterogeneity in conflict persistence, in 98 percent of the country-years with positive battle
deaths (936 of 959 observations), γ˜ is less than 0.95, where γ˜ is an estimate of persistence
that is allowed to depend on lagged-income. For the very poorest countries-years, however,
some estimates of γ˜ are greater than 1, suggesting that if conflicts do escalate in response
to past fighting, this effect is likely to be magnified in the poorest countries.
This section proceeds to analyze the dynamics of conflict as follows. We first consider
whether an AR(1) model fits the data well and assess whether conflicts exhibit explosive
dynamics, on average. After this evidence about average conflict behavior, richer models
that allow for heterogeneous conflict dynamics are presented. We then characterize the bias
that could result from static models.
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6.1 Model Fit and Average Dynamics
Are conflicts likely to exhibit explosive dynamics? Preliminary evidence from the prior
results sugggests the answer is no, on average. The extensive margin of conflict appears
substantially more persistent than the severity of conflict. The autocorrelation coefficient
governing the extensive margin of civil conflict is much larger than the autocorrelation coeffi-
cient governing the severity of conflicts, suggesting that conflicts do not escalate in intensity
solely because of past fighting, but conflicts are likely to smolder after they have started.25
Data visualization confirms that the autoregressive parameter estimates in the previous
section fit the conflict intensity data well. Figure 2 plots log battle deaths at time t against
log battle deaths in t− 1 in the restricted sample that only includes conflict years.26 Using
a locally weighted regression, the figure displays a semi-parametric model governing the
relationship between log battle deaths and lagged log battle deaths. A similar model is then
fit using OLS. The locally weighted model and OLS both fit the data well, and inspection
suggests that the linear fit does not differ significantly from the locally weighted fit. The
estimated slope of the linear fit is around 0.8, but it is important to note that this estimate
is not comparable to γˆ from the dynamic panel data models because observations with zero
battle deaths (a return to peace) are not included in the sample. The goal here is not
to estimate the γ parameter corresponding to the previous models but to assess whether
modeling γ as uniform in response to past fighting is a reasonable assumption.
[Figure 2 About Here]
This provides compelling evidence that an estimate of γ < 1 is reasonable. During spells
of conflict with at least 25 battle deaths, the probability of escalation to a higher number
of battle deaths in the next year is 0.327. Again, this raw statistic suggests that conflict
severity isn’t explosive in expectation.
6.2 Heterogeneous Conflict Dynamics
Does conflict persistence appear to differ based on observable characteristics? To answer
this question, we first estimate a model allowing heterogeneous conflict dynamics based on
25In fact, the estimated half-life of conflict from the estimates using warit as the dependent variable is
around 6 years.
26The choice of logs is to aid in presentation by minimizing the appearance of outliers, but the substantive
conclusions appear similar if the analysis is conducted in levels.
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income. Other sources of heterogeneity are then considered by splitting the sample based
on geographic, demographic, and economic features of the countries.
Table 4 presents the results. For a comparison with previous estimates, estimates of the
model with γ2 constrained to 0 are presented in Columns 1 and 3.
27 Estimates of summary
measures of the distribution of γ˜i,t−1 are presented in the bottom portion of Table 4.
Overall, conflict persistence does appear to be heterogeneous depending on income, as
past fighting is most likely to spill over into future fighting for poor countries. This allows a
more nuanced tests of whether conflicts are explosive, in expectation, by allowing dynamics
to be heterogeneous. In Column 4, we cannot reject that the dynamics of conflict at the
extensive margin vary based on lagged income. For the poorest country-years at war in the
sample, the estimated γ˜i,t−1 is greater than 1. The mean is around 0.74 in our preferred
specification (Column 4) with a standard deviation of about 0.14.
[Table 4 About Here]
Countries in war years in the top 5 percent of the distribution of γ˜ have estimated
persistence that is 7.9 times the bottom 5 percent of persistence in Column 2 and over
10 times the level of persistence in Column 4. This substantial amount of heterogeneity
highlights the very different evolution of civil conflicts in poor versus wealthy countries.
Wealth mediates the persistence of conflict over time.
Another possibility is that persistence depends on distinct characteristics that are largely
time-invariant, such as ethnic or religious fractionalization, mountainous terrain, and oil
wealth, which have all been linked to the incidence of civil war. To investigate if the dynamic
evolution of conflict varies across countries with and without these characteristics, the models
in Table 3 are estimated on samples restricted to countries that (a) are in the top half in terms
ethnic and religious fractionalization and mountainous terrain and (b) are oil exporters. The
results are presented in Table 5.
As above, the parameter estimate on log per-capita income is negative in all samples
and statistically significant in all but the religious fractionalization sample. The effect of
per-capita income was highest in mountainous countries, where the long-run effect of a unit
increase in income is approximately 1,260 fewer battle deaths. This magnitude is greater
than the full sample estimate of 720 and is consistent with the Fearon and Laitin finding
that mountainous countries may be more likely to experience war. However, mountainous
countries do not seem to be more prone to sustained fighting in response to past conflict.
27Results using log (Incomei,t−1/Populationi,t−1) or log (Incomeit/Populationit) appear similar.
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The estimated long-run magnitudes are smaller than the full sample for the top quartile of
religious fractionalization and oil-exporting countries while it is slightly larger for the top
quartile of ethnic fractionalization countries.
The persistence parameter estimate is positive and statistically significant across all sam-
ples. In virtually all sub-samples, the hypothesis that γ = 1 in Equation 4 is rejected.28
In general, conflicts are most persistent in ethnically fragmented countries. For the most
ethnically fractionalized countries, the persistence of conflict was approximately twice as
large as the next highest category. For ethnically fractionalized countries, the half life of
conflict ranged from 1.5 to 7.9, depending on the specification. The half lives for the other
sub-samples were generally smaller and estimated to be in narrower ranges. For religiously
fractionalized countries, the half life estimates ranged from 0.7 to 1.3. For mountainous coun-
tries, the estimates ranged from 0.9 to 3.1. Oil exporters had the least persistent conflicts,
with half lives ranging from 0.6 to 0.9.
[Table 5 About Here]
7 Discussion and Conclusion
7.1 Bias in Static Models
The estimates from the dynamic panel data models presented in the preceding section sug-
gest that the conflict process is dependent. Many prior papers use static models, but the
parameter estimates of any parameter of interest from static models are likely to be in-
consistent even with an instrument. This is easiest to see using first differences, but the
same logic applies to the within-transformed IV estimator because the justification for the
most prevalent instruments used in the literature–rainfall shocks and the price of commodity
exports–is that the instruments and the error are orthogonal conditional on the unobserved
fixed effects. However, these instruments are not likely to be valid without the fixed effects–
meaning that the instrument is correlated with the country effects. For example, a country’s
time-invariant mix of commodity exports or a country’s long-run average weather patterns
may influence the probability of civil war–but the within-country, time-varying instruments
would likely satisfy the exclusion restriction after accounting for the fixed effects if the con-
flict process were static. If the process is dynamic, the fixed effects cannot be differenced
28The only exception is Column 1 of Panel D.
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out, so the instrument is correlated with the error, violating the exclusion restriction.
The bias can be signed in the case of the first-differenced IV estimator. Ignoring time
fixed effects for exposition, let the true model generating the data be given by yit = γyi,t−1 +
xitβ + αi + εit, with E (x
′
itεit) 6= 0, E (z′itεit) = 0, E (ε′itεis) = 0 for s 6= t, and E (x′itzit) 6=
0. Suppose it is erroneously assumed that γ = 0, and estimation is via first-differenced
instrumental variables. The estimated parameter is βˆ = (∆z′it∆xit)
−1 ∆z′it∆yit and the bias
is
E
(
βˆ − β
)
= E
(
(∆z′it∆xit)
−1
∆z′it∆yi,t−1
)
γ. (7)
To sign the bias analytically, further assume that the time series relationship for the
instrument is zit = γzzi,t−1 + uit. 29 The bias is
E
(
(∆z′it∆xit)
−1
∆z′it∆yi,t−1
)
γ = E
(
(∆z′it∆xit)
−1
[(γz − 1) zit−1 + uit]′∆yi,t−1
)
γ.
The first stage implies that E (∆z′it∆xit) > 0 and γ is expected to be positive, so with these
restrictions, the term E
(
[(γz − 1) zit−1 + uit]′∆yi,t−1
)
determines the sign of the bias. After
substituting in zit−1 = γzzi,t−2 + uit−1, the relevant term becomes
E
[γzzit−1 + uit − zit−1] yit−1 −
γ2zzit−2 + γzuit−1 + uit︸ ︷︷ ︸
zit
− γzzit−2 − uit−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−zit−1
 yit−2
 .
Assuming that E (uityit−s) = 0 for s > 0 and taking expectations, the sign of the bias is
determined by
E ([γz − 1]zit−1yit−1 − [γz − 1]γzzit−2yit−2)
Suppose that the reduced form relationship E (yitzit) < 0 is constant for all t. If zit is
stationary, then γz < 1, which implies (γz − 1)− (γz − 1) γz < 0 so that E (yitzit) [(γz − 1)−
(γz − 1) γz] > 0. Combined with γ > 0 and E (∆z′it∆xit) > 0, parameter estimates from
static models are biased upward.
Presumably having an excluded instrument will alleviate some concern about the poten-
tial bias from a static model. However, this intuition is only true if the instrument zit is
orthogonal to both country fixed effects, αi, and the error, εit. Otherwise, the instrument
is only valid conditional on the procedure to remove αi ; these procedures will suffer from
29Dickey-Fuller style tests reject the null that γz = 1 in favor of an alternative that zit is a trend-stationary
process.
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Nickell (1981) bias in the case of the within-transformation or the bias derived previously in
the case of the first-difference transformation.
To test whether the instrument is orthogonal to αi, the null hypothesis is that the pooled
OLS IV estimator and the within-transformed IV estimator have the same probability limit.30
It is possible to construct over-identified estimators from moment conditions that impose
E (zit [αi + εit]) = 0 or only E (zitεit) = 0. Using 2 sets of moment conditions, the first
of which corresponds to pooled OLS IV and the second of which corresponds to within-
transformed IV, equality of the estimates is rejected at the 5 percent level using Hansen’s
J-test. The results of this test confirm that the variation used to estimate the effect of
income in static models is valid only conditional on fixed effects. However, if the true data
generating process is dynamic, static estimates are biased.
How large is the bias? The empirical estimate of the bias term for the first-differenced
IV estimator, (∆z′it∆xit)
−1 ∆z′it∆yi,t−1, is 2, 381. This suggests that static models may be
biased badly, and the bias is likely to be increasing in the degree of persistence.
7.2 Comparison to Estimates in the Literature
Given the voluminous literature examining the effects of changes in macroeconomic perfor-
mance on the probability that countries are aﬄicted with civil war, how do the estimates
above compare to those implied by previous research using the extensive margin of conflict?
Panel A of Table 6 estimates the same models as Table 3 using warit, the binary indicator
if the country experienced greater than 25 battle deaths. Panel B repeats the analysis with
warFLit, the Fearon and Laitin binary indicator of civil war, as the dependent variable. For
each panel, the columns report specifications estimated on each of the subsamples described
previously. We focus on the results in Panel A, as these come from a sample comparable to
the estimates in Table 3 of the main text. Comparing the results using battle deaths to the
same model using the two binary measures of civil war further highlights the importance of
the intensive margin.
The static number of battle deaths associated with a unit change in log-income can
be calculated as E (deaths|deaths > 0) × ∂ Pr(deaths>0)
∂ log(Income/Capita)
= E (deaths|deaths > 0) × β;
dividing by (1− γˆ) gives the total number of deaths. The mean number of battle deaths
given non-zero deaths is 2, 809 for the full sample. With βˆ = −0.0122 from the full sample in
Column 1, the static number of battle deaths reduced by a unit-change in log per-capita gdp
30The within-transformed moment conditions are used rather than the first-difference IV moment condi-
tions to preserve the same number of observations across specifications.
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is about 34. The long-run total reduction is 330 deaths. This is less than half the estimate
when using the battle deaths data. If using the data on battle deaths as a benchmark
for the true estimate of the marginal effect of log-income on conflict severity, using only
variation at the extensive margin significantly underestimates the effect of income changes
on the costliness of civil conflict.
[Table 6 About Here]
A comparison to the reported estimates in several other studies is also possible. In
the specification closest to ours, Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2010) find no statistically
significant relationship between changes in log per capita GDP and the incidence of civil
war. In their fixed effects specifications, the point estimates range from -0.09 to 0.12 and
are never statistically significant. Their point estimate of -0.06 implies that a unit increase
in GDP decreases expected battle deaths by approximately 169 casualties.31
The primary independent variable of interest in Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) is
economic growth instead of logged GDP per capita. Comparable estimates can be generated
by basing the expected battle deaths calculation on a one standard deviation change in
economic growth in their sample and comparing it to a calculation from a one standard
deviation change in logged GDP per capita in our sample.32 The coefficient estimates on
their contemporaneous growth variables range from -1.13 to -1.48.33 The decrease in expected
battle deaths from a one-standard deviation increase in growth ranges from 225.4 to 295.2
based on the Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) specification.34 Again, these magnitudes
are quite a bit smaller than our finding that a standard deviation increase in logged GDP
per capita is associated with a decrease of 465 expected battle deaths in the global sample.35
In addition to this body of research on the incidence of civil war, there are also two recent
31In our sample, the average number of battle deaths in a year with civil war is 2,809. Multiplying this
figure by the coefficient estimate on GDP per capita in a particular study generates estimates of the expected
battle deaths from a given change in logged GDP per capita.
32In their sample, the standard deviation of economic growth is 0.071 and in our sample, the standard
deviation of logged GDP per capita is 1.345.
33Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) also include lagged values of GDP growth as independent vari-
ables. The magnitudes of these estimates are generally larger than the contemporaneous values in their
sample, but we cannot directly compare these lagged results to our specifications.
34In our sample, the average number of battle deaths in a year of civil conflict in the sub-Saharan Africa
sample is 3,347. We could also compare expected battles deaths using this figure to reach estimates ranging
from 268.5 to 351.7, which also confirm the substantive conclusion that restricting attention to the extensive
margin underestimates the cost of civil war.
35The differences are further magnified when we include the future expected battle deaths from γˆ.
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papers (Lacina, 2006; Bazzi and Blattman, 2011) that study how economic shocks affect the
intensity of civil war. In contrast to the approach here, both of these papers restrict the
sample to country-years with strictly positive battle deaths. In a specification with logged
battle deaths as the dependent variable and an entire civil war as the unit of analysis,36
Lacina (2006) finds a coefficient estimate of -0.19 on lagged log GDP per-capita, but this
estimate is insignificant. While it is difficult to compare expected battle deaths directly due
to the differences in the specifications, one reasonable interpretation is that a unit increase
in log GDP per-capita is associated with a reduction of 2,311.8 expected battle deaths over
the full course of a civil war in Lacina (2006)’s model.37 The magnitude of this estimate
is quite a bit larger than our dynamic estimate of reductions in expected battle deaths.
In their specifications with battle deaths as the dependent variable, Bazzi and Blattman
(2011)’s coefficient estimates on contemporaneous commodity price changes range from -
803.5 to -430.3.38 Again, these expected decreases in battle deaths from a positive standard
deviation sized commodity shock are substantively larger in magnitude than our analogous
estimate from the full sample. Restricting the sample to observations with strictly positive
deaths seems to overstate the effects of macroeconomic performance on battle deaths from
civil conflict because the sample has no variation at the extensive margin.
7.3 Concluding Remarks
Accounting for the severity of civil wars is important to understanding the effects of income
on intrastate conflicts. Moving beyond the extent of civil wars provides two main conclusions.
We first found that economic shocks have a strong effect on the intensity of civil conflict.
This effect was especially strong compared with analogous results that focus only on the
extensive margin of conflict.
More importantly, our analysis of conflict severity afforded us the ability to analyze
the dynamics of civil conflict. We found that conflicts, on average, are persistent but not
explosive. Conflicts appear only to be explosive for the poorest countries. The persistence of
conflict also varied with income, with poorer countries having a much slower rate of mean-
reversion. The persistence of conflict also varied according to other country characteristics,
36This contrasts with our approach where we use a country-year as the unit of analysis.
37More precisely, the estimated constant term in the log-log regression is 9.5. When all of the independent
variables are set to 0 the expected number of battle deaths is approximately 13,359.7. A one unit increase
in the GDP variable reduces expected battle deaths to 11,047.9, which gives a decrease of 2,311.8 expected
battle deaths.
38Bazzi and Blattman (2011) standardize their commodity price shocks to have mean 0 and variance 1.
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with highly ethnically fractionalized countries suffering from the most persistent conflicts.
Apart from these results, this study gave one potential explanation for the wide variation
in findings regarding economic shocks and the extent of civil war. If the civil war process is
dynamic, as we found to be the case, then static models are biased. This bias could contribute
to the discrepancies in existing literature. This study also points towards a potentially
fruitful area of future research. Cross-national work on the onset and occurrence of civil war
triggered a rich body of within-country and micro-level work on the mechanisms of conflict.
This study points to how similar research might contribute to our understanding of the
dynamics of conflict.
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Figure 1:  Distribution of Log Battle Deaths in Conflict Years 
 
Kernel density plot and histogram of log number of battle deaths for conflicts during years with positive 
numbers of battle deaths. The distribution is truncated at approximately 3 because the battle deaths 
data only contain years with at least 25 deaths. 
  
Figure 2:  Log Battle Deaths in Year t Versus Log Deaths in Year t-1 
 
Scatterplot shows log battle deaths in year t-1 on the horizontal axis versus log deaths in year t on the 
vertical axis for consecutive years with strictly positive battle deaths. The red line is the predicted values 
from a regression of log deaths in year t on log deaths in t-1. The green line is from a locally weighted 
semi-parametric model. 
  
  
 
  
Table 1:  Summary Statistics
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A:  Full Sample
Battle Deaths 8,142 335 2,473 0 115,000
Binary War Indicator (>25 Deaths) 8,142 0.119 0.324 0 1
Log Income Per-Capita (1967 Dollars) 8,142 6.171 1.46 2.701 9.946
Panel B:  Sub-Saharan Africa
Battle Deaths 1,184 528 3418 0 115,000
Binary War Indicator (>25 Deaths) 1,184 0.158 0.365 0 1
Log Income Per-Capita (1967 Dollars) 1,184 4.808 0.85 2.701 7.851
Panel C:  Full Sample Excluding Western Democracies
Battle Deaths 7,182 379 2630 0 115,000
Binary War Indicator (>25 Deaths) 7,182 0.131 0.338 0 1
Log Income Per-Capita (1967 Dollars) 7,182 5.909 1.335 2.701 9.946
Panel D:  Full Sample Excluding Sub-Saharan Africa
Battle Deaths 6,258 277 2104 0 100,500
Binary War Indicator (>25 Deaths) 6,258 0.108 0.31 0 1
Log Income Per-Capita (1967 Dollars) 6,258 6.582 1.352 2.803 9.946
Panel E:  Top Half of Ethnic Fractionalization
Battle Deaths 4,737 422 2509 0 115000
Binary War Indicator (>25 Deaths) 4,737 0.136 0.343 0 1
Log Income Per-Capita (1967 Dollars) 4,737 5.826 1.392 2.706 9.946
Panel F:  Top Half of Religious Fractionalization
Battle Deaths 4,499 329 2996 0 115000
Binary War Indicator (>25 Deaths) 4,499 0.081 0.273 0 1
Log Income Per-Capita (1967 Dollars) 4,499 6.025 1.44 2.701 9.946
Panel G:  Top Half of Mountainous Countries
Battle Deaths 4,318 457 2753 0 115000
Binary War Indicator (>25 Deaths) 4,318 0.138 0.344 0 1
Log Income Per-Capita (1967 Dollars) 4,318 6.066 1.366 2.701 9.946
Panel H:  Oil Producing Countries
Battle Deaths 1,371 609 4698 0 115000
Binary War Indicator (>25 Deaths) 1,371 0.163 0.369 0 1
Log Income Per-Capita (1967 Dollars) 1,371 6.275 1.139 3.688 9.477
Notes:  Summary statistics for the estimation samples presented in later tables.  See the text for variable 
definitions.
   
Table 2:  First Stage Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Excluding 
Western 
Democracies
Excluding Sub-
Saharan Africa
Panel A:  Dependent Variable is First Differenced Per-Capita Income
Lag of First Differenced Exports Instrument 0.195*** 0.995*** 0.206*** 0.144**
(0.0621) (0.322) (0.0631) (0.0605)
Observations 8,055 1,862 7,095 6,193
R-Squared 0.157 0.197 0.148 0.158
F-Statistic 39.70 12.75 33.46 31.13
Panel B:  Same as Panel A with country fixed effects (for country-specific time trends in level equation)
Lag of First Differenced Exports Instrument 0.159** 1.005*** 0.161** 0.126**
(0.0653) (0.364) (0.0660) (0.0640)
Observations 8,055 1,862 7,095 6,193
R-Squared 0.185 0.216 0.175 0.181
F-Statistic 10.69 8.837 9.893 9.614
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.  Table presents first differenced estimates of the first stage 
regression of log gdp per-capita on the export-weighted income of trading partners in non-adjacent countries.  Adjacent 
countries are defined by the Correlates of War dataset.  Adjacent countries share a land or river border or are 
separated by less than 400 miles of water.  All models contain year fixed effects.  Panel B adds country fixed effects to 
accomodate country-specific time trends.  Numbers of observations differ between this and later tables because of 
differences between first differenced and orthogonal deviations transformations and use of moment conditions in 
levels.
 Table 3:  Estimates from Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel Data Models of the Battle Deaths Process
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Sub-Saharan Africa
Excluding Western 
Democracies
Excluding Sub-
Saharan Africa
Panel A:  Excluded instruments are shocks to export partners and lags of battle deaths
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -321.3*** -289.4** -295.4*** -482.6***
(118.2) (124.8) (112.6) (133.6)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.554*** 0.710*** 0.563*** 0.422***
(0.114) (0.0734) (0.115) (0.104)
β / (1-γ) -720 -998 -676 -835
Half-Life 1.2 2 1.2 0.8
Observations 8,142 1,884 7,182 6,258
Number of Countries 203 43 183 160
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 0.215 1 0.599 0.938
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.0373 0.209 0.0368 0.0959
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.667 0.428 0.679 0.619
Panel B:  Excluded instruments are shocks to trading partners and lags of war indicators times conflict duration
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -129.5** -182.6* -127.6*** -225.7***
(50.41) (95.34) (49.02) (71.99)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.759*** 0.828*** 0.763*** 0.584***
(0.0737) (0.0412) (0.0706) (0.101)
β / (1-γ) -537 -1062 -538 -543
Half-Life 2.5 3.7 2.6 1.3
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 0.269 1 0.587 0.949
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.0340 0.212 0.0344 0.0997
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.894 0.449 0.897 0.877
Panel C:  Panel A including country-specific time trends
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -887.4* -1,074*** -796.7* -797.0
(455.8) (413.7) (479.8) (518.6)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.459*** 0.628*** 0.468*** 0.396***
(0.0993) (0.0696) (0.101) (0.0989)
β / (1-γ) -1640 -2887 -1498 -1320
Half-Life 0.9 1.5 0.9 0.7
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 0 1 0 0
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.0457 0.209 0.0438 0.102
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.500 0.424 0.519 0.562
Panel D:  Panel B including country-specific time trends
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -402.3** -885.4** -377.9* -131.5
(188.4) (370.6) (205.4) (90.43)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.704*** 0.915*** 0.712*** 0.568***
(0.0768) (0.0839) (0.0777) (0.102)
β / (1-γ) -1359 -10416 -1312 -218
Half-Life 2 7.8 2 1.2
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 1 1 1 1
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.0343 0.227 0.0334 0.0962
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.848 0.465 0.857 0.846
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Table reports Blundell-Bond estimates of the battle deaths model as described in the 
text.  All models include the export-weighted log per capita gdp of trading partners as instruments.  Panel-style instruments are 
described in the panel headings.  A maximum of 3 lags of the panel-style instruments is used, and the beginning and ending lags are 
dynamically adjusted based on the results of AB tests of autocorrelation as described in the text.  The p-value of Hansen's  test of 
overidentifying restrictions is also reported.  Observation counts are the same in all panels.
   
Table 4:  Estimates Including Heterogeneous Dynamics 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specification:
DV: Battle Deaths; 
IVs: Lags of Deaths, 
Exports
DV: Battle Deaths; 
IVs: Lags of Deaths, 
Exports, Exports * 
Lags of War * 
Duration 
DV: Battle Deaths; 
IVs: Lags of War * 
Duration, Exports
DV: Battle Deaths; 
IVs: Lags of War * 
Duration, Exports, 
Exports * Lags of 
War * Duration 
β:  Parameter Estimate on Lag of Log Income/Capita -279.1** -144.6** -124.4** -73.20**
(112.4) (57.78) (49.75) (36.96)
γ1:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.557*** 1.345** 0.762*** 1.348***
(0.115) (0.557) (0.0714) (0.212)
γ2: Parameter Estimate on Lag of Log Income/Capita x -0.156 -0.114**
Battle Deaths t-1 (0.116) (0.0466)
Observations 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062
Number of Countries 203 203 203 203
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 0.220 0.195 0.269 0.301
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.0373 0.0541 0.0345 0.0412
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.690 0.465 0.943 0.876
Summary Measures of Persistence For Years With Deathst-1 > 0:  
Persistence Calculated as γ1 * Deathst-1 +γ2 * Deathst-1 x Log Incomet-1 / Deathst-1
Mean 0.512 0.741
Std. Dev 0.189 0.138
5th Percentile 0.131 0.463
10th Percentile 0.244 0.545
50th Percentile 0.531 0.755
90th Percentile 0.747 0.912
95th Percentile 0.773 0.931
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Table reports Blundell-Bond estimates of the battle deaths model with heterogeneous 
persistence as described in the text.  All models include the export-weighted log per capita gdp of trading partners as instruments.  Columns 1 
and 2 use lags of battle deaths as panel-style instruments and lags of battle deaths interacted with the exports measure as an IV style 
instrument.  Columns 3 and 4 use the war indicator times conflict duration as panel-style instruments and lags of the war indicator times 
duration interacted with the exports measure as an IV style instrument.  A maximum of 3 lags of the panel-style instruments is used, and the 
beginning and ending lags are dynamically adjusted based on the results of AB tests of autocorrelation as described in the text.  
 Table 5:  Estimates of Average Persistence on Samples Split by Country Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top Half of Ethnic 
Fractionalization
Top Half of Religious 
Fractionalization
Top Half of 
Mountainous
Oil Producers
Panel A:  Excluded instruments are shocks to export partners and lags of battle deaths
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -242.8*** -314.0** -562.9** -228.0**
(74.29) (148.4) (224.7) (102.0)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.719*** 0.502*** 0.553*** 0.326***
(0.0787) (0.135) (0.147) (0.0907)
β / (1-γ) -864 -631 -1259 -338
Half-Life 2.1 1 1.2 0.6
Observations 4,737 4,499 4,318 1,371
Number of Countries 125 120 115 32
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 1.000 1.000 1 1
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.162 0.0661 0.0468 0.0936
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.157 0.389 0.781 0.201
Panel B:  Excluded instruments are shocks to trading partners and lags of war indicators times conflict duration
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -97.42* -217.4** -155.5* -139.7*
(53.94) (107.7) (93.99) (77.51)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.871*** 0.592*** 0.775*** 0.470***
(0.0273) (0.120) (0.116) (0.0768)
β / (1-γ) -755 -533 -691 -264
Half-Life 5 1.3 2.7 0.9
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.170 0.0433 0.0692 0.101
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.159 0.533 0.973 0.158
Panel C:  Panel A including country-specific time trends
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -961.1*** -1,030 -1,583*** -370.0
(371.4) (817.6) (582.2) (497.9)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.626*** 0.385*** 0.448*** 0.327**
(0.0690) (0.115) (0.151) (0.135)
β / (1-γ) -2570 -1675 -2868 -550
Half-Life 1.5 0.7 0.9 0.6
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 0 0 0 1
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.158 0.0817 0.0340 0.0868
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.166 0.261 0.590 0.268
Panel D:  Panel B including country-specific time trends
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -526.5** -659.5 -497.1** -337.3
(232.5) (712.2) (251.8) (242.0)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.916*** 0.507*** 0.799*** 0.454***
(0.0741) (0.124) (0.135) (0.130)
β / (1-γ) -6268 -1338 -2473 -618
Half-Life 7.9 1 3.1 0.9
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 1 1 1 1
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.177 0.0400 0.0770 0.107
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.157 0.512 0.981 0.237
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  For details, see Table 3.
Appendix
When deaths data are unavailable for particular years, the Uppsala/PRIO dataset does not
report a “best estimate”. Interpolation using adjacent years of data is used to fill in missing
observations in these cases. Sub-saharan Africa is the region with the most missing data.
There are 193 conflict-years that include a “best estimate” in the Uppsala/PRIO dataset for
sub-saharan Africa, but there are 121 observations missing when conflicts are occurring in
the same country in adjacent years. Interpolation thus provides an additional 121 country-
years of data for sub-saharan Africa. For other regions, the discrepancy is much smaller.
There are 511 conflict-years outside of sub-saharan Africa with an available “best estimate”
in Uppsala/PRIO, and interpolation fills in another 182 conflict-years. Appendix Table
1 shows the results that exclude these observations and only uses observations for which
distinct, yearly deaths data were available. Estimates differ, especially in sub-Saharan
Africa, for two reasons: first, the number of observations with data on battle deaths falls–
reducing statistical power; second, the conflicts that remain are, on average, less severe than
the excluded conflicts that require interpolation.
As a further robustness check regarding whether interpolation affects the results on dy-
namics, Figure A1 re-produces the results from Figure 2 without using the interpolated
measures of battle deaths. The results suggest that interpolation does not substantively
change the interpretation or estimates of γ.
Finally, as an additional assessment of the importance of measurement error, the models
in Tables 3 and 5 were re-estimated using the ”low” battle deaths series. The mean number
of battle deaths in a country-year using the low series is 121compared to 335 deaths in the
series used in Tables 3 and 5. The ”low” estimate is populated in all country years; in
country years where both the ”low” series is populated and the ”best” estimate is populated,
the low series has a mean of 89 battle deaths and the best estimate has a mean of 173 battle
deaths. Given these differences in means, it is not surprising that the marginal effect of
income is smaller when using the ”low” data. The estimated AR (1) parameter is also larger
in these models, suggesting that prior estimates of serial dependence are conservative.
Readers who are interested in comparisons with the extensive margin should exercise
caution when combining results with the ”low” series and estimates of the extensive margin
from the text. Calculations were conducted using the moments of the battle deaths data;
because the first and second moments of the ”low” series and the ”best” series differ, the
results are not comparable when using the ”low” series.
Figure A1:  Non-Interpolated Log Battle Deaths in Year t Versus Log Deaths in Year t-1 
 
Kernel density plot and histogram of log number of battle deaths for conflicts during years with positive 
numbers of battle deaths. The distribution is truncated at approximately 3 because the battle deaths 
data only contain years with at least 25 deaths.  The data and estimates exclude all observations based 
on interpolated battle deaths. 
  
  
  
Appendix Table 1:  Estimates from Blundell-Bond Models Without Interpolated Battle Deaths
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Sub-Saharan Africa
Excluding Western 
Democracies
Excluding Sub-
Saharan Africa
Panel A:  Excluded instruments are shocks to export partners and lags of battle deaths
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -221.9*** -58.12 -224.8*** -428.5***
(75.87) (93.71) (75.80) (102.3)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.406*** 0.828*** 0.410*** 0.247***
(0.126) (0.109) (0.126) (0.0932)
β / (1-γ) -374 -338 -381 -569
Observations 7,788 1,744 6,828 6,044
Number of ccode 203 43 183 160
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 0.226 1 0.614 0.985
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.0383 0.0423 0.0380 0.0746
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.747 0.179 0.761 0.531
Panel B:  Excluded instruments are shocks to trading partners and lags of war indicators times conflict duration
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -79.99*** -80.06 -80.44** -169.5***
(31.04) (61.21) (34.86) (57.12)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.698*** 0.788*** 0.701*** 0.528***
(0.117) (0.105) (0.114) (0.154)
β / (1-γ) -265 -378 -269 -359
Observations 7,788 1,744 6,828 6,044
Number of ccode 203 43 183 160
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 0.221 1 0.586 0.942
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.0504 0.0632 0.0518 0.0487
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.720 0.197 0.716 0.592
Panel C:  Panel A including country-specific time trends
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -559.5** -388.6 -619.1** -463.1
(258.6) (262.6) (275.6) (283.1)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.364*** 0.807*** 0.365*** 0.206**
(0.123) (0.0965) (0.124) (0.0865)
β / (1-γ) -880 -2013 -975 -583
Observations 7,788 1,744 6,828 6,044
Number of ccode 203 43 183 160
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 0 1 0 0
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.0421 0.0424 0.0415 0.0845
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.624 0.184 0.628 0.416
Panel D:  Panel B including country-specific time trends
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -319.2** -598.6* -328.1** -285.7*
(129.0) (341.4) (146.6) (164.1)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.640*** 0.753*** 0.641*** 0.458***
(0.125) (0.101) (0.122) (0.139)
β / (1-γ) -887 -2423 -914 -527
Observations 7,788 1,744 6,828 6,044
Number of ccode 203 43 183 160
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 1 1 1 1
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.0484 0.0613 0.0494 0.0573
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.771 0.204 0.767 0.742
Notes:  See Notes for Table 3.  Sample sizes differ because observations with interpolated data on battle deaths are excluded.
 Appendix Table 2:  Estimates from Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel Data Models using the "Low" Battle Deaths Series
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full Sample
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Excluding 
Western 
Democracies
Excluding Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
Top Half of 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization
Top Half of 
Religious 
Fractionalization
Top Half of 
Mountainous
Oil Producers
Panel A:  Excluded instruments are shocks to export partners and lags of battle deaths
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -52.22** -60.01 -58.48** -182.3*** -53.35** -70.58*** -51.74 -20.65
(23.02) (42.83) (25.50) (47.16) (21.96) (27.11) (32.85) (14.81)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.758*** 0.813*** 0.755*** 0.330** 0.825*** 0.819*** 0.852*** 0.555***
(0.0969) (0.0680) (0.0941) (0.161) (0.0695) (0.0686) (0.0360) (0.0168)
β / (1-γ) -216 -321 -239 -272 -305 -390 -350 -46
Half-Life 2.5 3.3 2.5 0.6 3.6 3.5 4.3 1.2
Observations 8,142 1,884 7,182 6,258 4,737 4,499 4,318 1,371
Number of Countries 203 43 183 160 125 120 115 32
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 0.176 1 0.515 0.947 1.000 1.000 1.000 1
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.0377 0.142 0.0370 0.0381 0.0546 0.0983 0.0448 0.166
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.586 0.217 0.584 0.118 0.253 0.264 0.951 0.179
Panel B:  Excluded instruments are shocks to trading partners and lags of war indicators times conflict duration
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -34.60** -83.40* -39.79** -115.6*** -54.59 -50.18 -26.37 -19.79
(14.66) (47.47) (15.98) (41.24) (38.87) (32.33) (26.14) (13.77)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.861*** 0.879*** 0.864*** 0.482** 0.905*** 0.875*** 0.916*** 0.631***
(0.0582) (0.0158) (0.0538) (0.208) (0.0158) (0.0152) (0.0371) (0.0592)
β / (1-γ) -249 -689 -293 -223 -575 -401 -314 -54
Half-Life 4.6 5.4 4.7 0.9 6.9 5.2 7.9 1.5
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 0.197 1 0.555 0.987 1.000 1.000 1.000 1
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.0360 0.141 0.0367 0.0294 0.0560 0.0985 0.0464 0.170
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.572 0.224 0.571 0.0690 0.256 0.279 0.944 0.200
Panel C:  Panel A including country-specific time trends
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -256.6** -274.8 -257.3** -309.5* -245.7 -357.0 -313.2* -139.3**
(100.4) (214.4) (107.4) (161.2) (163.9) (218.9) (173.4) (68.04)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.634*** 0.736*** 0.636*** 0.305* 0.777*** 0.766*** 0.828*** 0.568***
(0.110) (0.0865) (0.104) (0.161) (0.0984) (0.113) (0.0716) (0.0394)
β / (1-γ) -701 -1041 -707 -445 -1102 -1526 -1821 -322
Half-Life 1.5 2.3 1.5 0.6 2.7 2.6 3.7 1.2
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.0264 0.151 0.0266 0.0368 0.0583 0.106 0.0459 0.197
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.598 0.210 0.596 0.109 0.257 0.255 0.976 0.175
Panel D:  Panel B including country-specific time trends
β: Parameter Estimate on Log Income/Capita -149.4 -598.9** -169.3 -102.8* -245.6 -430.1 -249.1* -63.43**
(92.77) (295.1) (110.6) (60.19) (180.9) (301.3) (146.9) (29.09)
γ:  Parameter Estimate on Battle Deaths t-1 0.862*** 1.010*** 0.878*** 0.456** 1.011*** 1.068*** 1.017*** 0.661***
(0.104) (0.0753) (0.108) (0.205) (0.112) (0.149) (0.102) (0.0725)
β / (1-γ) -1083 N/A -1388 -189 N/A N/A N/A -187
Half-Life 4.7 N/A 5.3 0.9 N/A N/A N/A 1.7
Overidentifying Restrictions p-value 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AB Test of AR 1 p-value 0.0343 0.227 0.0334 0.0962 0.0614 0.112 0.0503 0.208
AB Test of AR 2 p-value 0.848 0.465 0.857 0.846 0.241 0.254 0.940 0.196
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Table reports Blundell-Bond estimates of the battle deaths model as described in the text.  All models include the export-
weighted log per capita gdp of trading partners as instruments.  Panel-style instruments are described in the panel headings.  A maximum of 3 lags of the panel-style 
instruments is used, and the beginning and ending lags are dynamically adjusted based on the results of AB tests of autocorrelation as described in the text.  The p-value of 
Hansen's  test of overidentifying restrictions is also reported.
